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 State and Local Government Finance in the Current Crisis: 





A review of recent fiscal history can help to understand the mechanisms by which 
subnational governments adapt their tax, expenditure, and debt policies to an ever-
changing economic environment, and on the role of fiscal assistance from higher-level 
governments in this process.  In principle, proposed Federal assistance to states and 
localities may provide useful macroeconomic stimulus and financial support, but past 
experience, in the US and elsewhere, highlights the pitfalls in achieving rapid delivery of 
substantial assistance while simultaneously targeting scarce fiscal resources to the most 
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 I. Introduction 
 
State and local governments are among the many institutions, public and private, that are 
suffering from the recent turmoil in financial markets.  Disruptions of the market for 
auction-rate securities, doubts about the financial stability of municipal bond insurers 
(reflected in downgrades by rating agencies), and uncertainty about the meaningfulness 
of bond ratings themselves are among the symptoms of this turmoil.
1  Increasingly, 
stresses arising within the financial markets are compounded by changing economic 
conditions: a downturn in overall economic activity is reducing revenue flows to state 
and local governments at the same time that demands for many public services – income- 
and employment-conditioned social services in particular – are rising.   As of the time of 
writing, it is far too early to draw any firm conclusions about the fundamental causes and 
ultimate consequences of the current economic and financial crisis.  But it may be useful 
to review some branches of previous research, based on the experience of subnational 
government finance in the US and abroad, that can provide some partial insights into 
recent events.  As will become apparent, our understanding of subnational government 
finance in the midst of financial crises is imperfect, and there are many fruitful lines of 
inquiry for future research.    
 
This paper begins with a short review of some of the history of state and local public 
finance in the US.  Even in the postwar era, to say nothing of earlier periods, subnational 
governments have had to cope with episodes of economic, financial, and fiscal distress, 
and, at least to date, they have demonstrated a capacity to adjust their policies, when 
  1necessary, to maintain their long-run financial viability.  Section III describes an 
analytical framework for modeling this adjustment process and summarizes the findings 
of some recent research devoted to the study of municipal government finance.  Research 
to date has examined municipal governments in the US and Germany, and a comparison 
of the two shows that they differ, in important ways, because of the differing degrees to 
which municipal governments are supported by fiscal transfers from higher level 
governments.   These findings are of some interest, in view of recent proposals to extend 
special financial relief to state and local governments in order to deal with current 
exigencies. Section IV discusses some of the potential advantages, as well as the pitfalls, 
of such policies.  
 
II. Some Historical Perspective 
 
To begin with, it should not be forgotten that state and local governments have been 
through many ups and downs during past decades.  Each “crisis” has its own distinctive 
features, but it is well recognized that the public finances of state and local governments 
have never been immune to economic cycles.  At the same time, state and local 
government finances have exhibited a certain overall stability, suggesting that their fiscal 
systems, and the legal and political frameworks underpinning them, have displayed a 
significant degree of resiliency.  
 
Some references to previous literature can help to provide perspective.  Edward 
Gramlich, an eminent long-time analyst of subnational government finances in the US, 
  2wrote a paper in 1978 entitled “State and Local Budgets the Day after it Rained: Why is 
the Surplus So High?” which begins (p. 191) by stating that “[r]eaders of the financial 
press will be shocked to find that …the 78,000 state and local governments in this 
country are running a hefty surplus”.  This surplus was shocking because it occurred soon 
after the 1975 recession. (New York City nearly defaulted on its municipal debt in 1975, 
marking this not only as a recession year, but a year of substantial financial market 
distress.)  This mid-1970s episode may serve as a reminder that not all risks, in the 
neutral sense of fluctuations, are to the downside: financial and economic conditions can 
change rapidly and unexpectedly for the better.  Of course, la plus ca change, la plus c’est 
la meme chose: such is the way of cycles.  By 1991, Gramlich had occasion to write an 
article entitled “The 1991 State and Local Fiscal Crisis”, which begins with these telling 
remarks: “Every decade or so the state and local government sector begins to behave 
strangely.”  On that occasion, of course, subnational fiscal balances were worsening.  
 
Despite the inevitable cycles to which subnational governments have been subject, one 
must acknowledge that the current system by no means represents the worst of all 
possible worlds.  The precise extent to which the policies of state and local governments 
in the US have contributed to the development of the US economy for the past two 
centuries can certainly be debated, but they have evidently not prevented US economic 
growth over long periods of time.  Indeed, there is at least a prima facie case that 
subnational governments, involved as they have been in the provision of education, 
transportation, public safety, and other important services, may well have provided an 
essential part of the framework for economic growth over long periods of time.  In any 
  3case, these services have been provided essentially uninterruptedly for almost all citizens 
for the past century and longer, surely a sign that the fiscal systems of state and local 
governments have generally been quite able to adapt to the many short- as well as long-
term economic, demographic, technological, and other shocks and trends that have 
confronted them for many decades.  These adaptations are by no means costless, of 
course, and many groups might wish that subnational government policies would take 
their interests more prominently into account. The beneficiaries of public services have 
been disappointed when services have been cut, taxpayers have been disappointed when 
taxes have gone up, public sector employees have been disappointed when jobs have 
been cut, and bondholders have been disappointed when debt has not been repaid.
2   Few 
would wish to argue that every policy decision by every unit of subnational government 
has been fully optimal, but the system of fiscal federalism in the US has arguably served 
the nation reasonably well.  This is a system that scholars continue to study.  One good 
reason to do so is that sound policymaking, in times of crisis, should preserve and build 
upon the strengths of the existing system, even if policy innovations are needed in order 
to manage to cope with some of the strange and unique problems that seem to crop up 
every decade or so.
3 
 
III. Subnational Government Fiscal Adjustment: Some Recent Findings 
At times of fiscal and financial distress, it is commonplace and very natural for 
policymakers and commentators to make many proposals for large and small reforms.  
How can governments continue to provide essential services?  Where will the money 
come from?  How can defaults and bankruptcies be averted?  What policies can provide 
  4needed economic stimulus?  In the face of changing economic circumstances, and 
through a complex process of political haggling, at all levels of government, policies are 
finally determined.  This complex process must inevitably respect fundamental economic 
and financial constraints on the revenue raising capacities of governments and on the 
ability of financial markets to absorb government debt.  Although the adaptation of fiscal 
and financial policies in times of crisis may capture greater attention and produce more 
controversy than in more ordinary circumstances, and although the crisis of the day often 
appears to be more severe than those that have gone before, the adaptation of government 
policy to shifting economic, demographic, financial, and other circumstances is in fact a 
continuous process.  Taxes go up and down, spending goes up and down, and borrowing 
goes up and down, at all levels of government and at all times.   
 
This section summarizes some recent research that aims to shed light on the nature of this 
dynamic process of fiscal adjustment. . To date, this research has examined fiscal 
adjustments by municipal governments in the US and Germany during the past several 
decades.
4 The findings of this empirical research, and particularly the contrast between 
the results for the US and Germany, shed light on some of the policy options that 
government policymakers face when considering such issues as possible expansions of 
fiscal transfers to subnational governments in times of distress.  
 
To begin with, consider a very simple and fundamental question: in the long run, are the 
finances of a government “balanced”, or, in somewhat different language, financially 
sustainable?  This question has been investigated at the level of national governments by 
  5such authors as Bonn (1991) and others, who examine the long-run development of 
public expenditures, taxes, and debt for countries such as the US and other countries.  At 
any point in time, a government’s expenditures can outpace its revenues, provided either 
that it has previously accumulated assets that can be liquidated and used to finance 
current spending or that it can borrow to make up the difference between spending and 
revenues.  Current tax and expenditures decisions affect the future, however: the 
depletion of existing assets, and the accumulation of new liabilities, imply that future 
spending must be lower, or future revenues must be higher, than otherwise would be the 
case.
5 If this year’s borrowing B becomes next year’s debt plus interest, (1 + r)B, it can be 
repaid at that time either by raising more taxes or by cutting spending, or both. Of course, 
it may not be absolutely necessary to repay this year’s borrowing plus interest in the 
coming year.  Instead, it might be possible to postpone repayment for an additional year, 
though of course at the expense of having to cut spending or raise revenues in that year 
sufficient to retire the debt plus interest of (1 + r)
2B.  By continuing this process, it is 
possible to defer repayment of this year’s borrowing for many years, or even indefinitely.  
Nevertheless, one must anticipate that governments cannot simply rely indefinitely on 
borrowing to finance all of their expenditures: otherwise, why pay taxes at all? Indeed, as 
a condition of long-run solvency, it is usually postulated that governments must adhere to 
a long-run budget constraint that states that the present value of future government 
expenditures, plus the level of outstanding initial debt obligations, must be equal to the 
present value of government revenues.  Symbolically, this “long-run government budget 
constraint” may be written as 
G + B0 = R 
  6where G is the present value of all government expenditures, R is the present value of all 
government revenues, and B0 is initial debt outstanding.    
 
This long-run budget constraint embodies the important point that, at least in the absence 
of regulatory or other constraints, governments do not have to balance their budgets in 
the “short run”.  One cannot look at any one year’s expenditures, revenues, and 
borrowing in isolation to see whether fiscal policy is sustainable. Indeed, one main 
function of government borrowing (and its negative, government saving) is to enable 
governments to “detach” the flow of current revenues from the flow of current 
expenditures.   In particular, at a time of fiscal “crisis”, governments can use borrowing 
to maintain or even increase expenditures in the face of declining revenues and, in 
principle, this provides a means by which governments can “smooth” taxes and 
expenditures over time, even in the face of fluctuations in economic activity.  Bohn 
(1991) and other authors have investigated the long-run dynamics of government 
finances at the Federal level, confirming that fiscal policies, in the past, do seem to 
comply with the government’s long run budget constraint.   
 
A similar analysis can be undertaken for subnational governments, although, for these 
governments, it is particularly important to take transfers to or from other levels of 
government explicitly into account.  In 2005-2006, Federal transfers to state and local 
governments accounted for 22% and 4% of their revenues, respectively, while state 
transfers to localities amounted to 30% of local revenues.  State government transfers to 
localities exceeded Federal transfers to states, although only by about 6%.  (Thus, in 
  7terms of aggregate net transfers, states may be viewed approximately as conduits for 
Federal funds flowing to localities.) If T is the present value of net transfers from other 
levels of government, the long-run budget constraint for a subnational government can be 
written as 
G + B0 = R + T, 
which shows that subnational government expenditures and debt obligations can be 
financed not only through own-source revenues, but also through transfers from other 
governments.  Thus, a state or local government may be able to finance a level of 
expenditures over time that would not be sustainable through its own tax and nontax 
revenues if it is the beneficiary of sufficiently large fiscal transfers from another (usually 
higher level) government.  
 
As reported in detail in Buettner and Wildasin (2006), an analysis of the fiscal policies of 
approximately 1000 municipalities, large and small, over a period of a quarter century, 
shows that municipal governments in the US do adjust their finances over time so as to 
adhere to their long-run budget constraints.  An increase in a municipality’s deficit in one 
year, resulting, for instance, from increased spending or reduced revenues, is offset by 
changes in fiscal policies in later years, with large responses within a year or two and 
with diminishing impacts in later years. By decomposing municipal finances into 
outflows of expenditures and debt service and inflows of own-source revenues and 
intergovernmental transfers, one can examine the extent to which changes in each of 
these fiscal variables offset changes in any one of them so as to maintain long-run budget 
balance.  For instance, for a typical municipality, an increase in expenditures in one year 
  8is followed by increases in taxes, in intergovernmental transfers, and in debt service, as 
well as by reductions in expenditures, in subsequent years.  As a matter of fact, this latter 
“own-effect” – the response of future expenditures to changes in current expenditures -- 
is quite large: in present-value terms, an increase in expenditures in one year is offset by 
a more than 70% decrease in future expenditures.  Consequently, to maintain long-run 
fiscal balance when expenditures rise, comparatively modest adjustments are required for 
other fiscal instruments: in present-value terms, own-source revenues rise by about 16%, 
grants from higher level governments rise by about 8%, and debt service rises by less 
than 2% of the amount of an increase in municipal expenditures.  All of these findings 
hold, in reverse, when expenditures fall.  
 
In contrast, a change in own-source revenues gives rise to a rather different pattern of 
fiscal adjustment.  If revenues go up in one year, future revenues fall by only about 35% 
of this amount, in present-value terms.  Future expenditures rise by 51%, grants fall by 
9%, and debt service falls, but by less than 1%, in present-value terms.  
 
These and other results indicate that municipalities have succeeded in navigating a path 
to fiscal sustainability over a long period of time.  They have done so, in substantial part, 
by adjusting those components of fiscal policy over which they have relatively direct 
control: their spending, and their own tax and nontax revenues.  These adjustments are 
not instantaneous, however.  Moreover, transfers from higher-level governments play a 
significant role in the process.  To some extent, increases in expenditures or reductions in 
  9own-source revenues are offset by increases in transfers from higher-level governments, 
enabling municipalities to adhere to their long-run budget constraints.  
 
By way of comparison, Buettner (2007) discovers some interesting points of contrast 
between the fiscal adjustment processes of municipalities in the US and Germany.  As in 
the US, intergovernmental transfers are quite important in the German federation, and, in 
fact, they are larger, as a source of finance, for German as compared with US 
municipalities. Furthermore, the German system has elements that are explicitly designed 
to equalize the fiscal resources of municipalities.  No doubt largely for this reason, it 
seems, empirically, that changes in fiscal transfers play a much larger role in the fiscal 
adjustment process of German municipalities than is true for their American counterparts.   
In particular, fluctuations in own-source revenues are offset by compensatory changes in 
fiscal transfers (especially through the equalization system) to a much greater extent than 
in the US.  Whereas a one-unit increase in local taxes is followed by a subsequent 
decrease in transfers of about 9% in the US, as mentioned above, the corresponding 
figure for German municipalities is about 15%.  For sustained increases in revenues (as 
opposed to a one-year fluctuation), the figure for the US is about 13%, whereas for 
Germany it is about 34%, more than 2.5 times higher.  
 
Although these figures must be interpreted with care, they strongly suggest that the 
German system is one in which a substantially larger fraction of the ups and downs of 
local revenue fluctuations are absorbed by higher level governments than is the case in 
the US.  At a time of financial and fiscal distress, when local revenues are falling, 
  10changes in equalizing transfers can provide German municipalities with significantly 
greater relief than would be true for their American counterparts.  Not surprisingly, then, 
a fall in revenue for US municipalities is followed by substantially larger reductions in 
expenditures in subsequent years than is true for German municipalities. In these 
important respects, and others, the process of fiscal adjustment for German local 
governments differs significantly from that of the US.  
 
Buettner (2007) also points out that the own-source revenue bases of German and US 
local governments differ in important ways.  Property taxes account for a large fraction of 
the own-source revenues collected by local governments in the US.  German 
municipalities also derive revenue from similar taxes.  However, they are much more 
dependent than US municipalities on taxes on business activity – a revenue source that is 
far more sensitive to changing economic conditions than the property tax.  As a 
consequence, their revenues may exhibit greater variability than is true for US cities.  
Perhaps the equalization system is therefore particularly important and useful in the 
German case, as it helps cities to cope with relatively large revenue fluctuations: the 
contributions of those with high levels of revenues are transferred to, and thus insure, 
those with revenue shortfalls.  On the other hand, as Buettner notes, cities do have some 
discretion about the mix of revenue sources they employ.  One dimension of policy 
discretion is the balance between relatively stable and relatively volatile sources of tax 
revenue, and the fiscal equalization system may well influence the policy tradeoffs 
between these types of taxes.  By protecting municipalities from some of the 
consequences of revenue shortfalls, equalizing transfers may encourage greater reliance 
  11on revenue sources that would otherwise be seen as too risky to support important 
municipal government functions.   
 
IV. Federal Assistance to Subnational Governments: Policy Goals and Challenges 
 
In the current financial and fiscal crisis, some commentators – including economic policy 
advisers for the incoming administration -- have called for large increases in Federal 
government assistance for states and localities (Romer and Bernstein, 2009).  There are 
several purported benefits to be realized from such relief.  First, because subnational 
government revenues have fallen, states and localities are likely to curtail spending.  
From a macroeconomic perspective, such a response may exacerbate the recession by 
weakening aggregate demand.  From a financial perspective, falling revenues may impair 
the ability of subnational governments to repay their debt obligations in a timely manner, 
and this prospect may limit the willingness of market participants to purchase subnational 
government financial obligations on favorable terms.  From a public finance and public 
policy perspective, falling revenues, possibly combined with reduced access to capital 
markets, may force subnational governments to limit their expenditures and thus to forgo 
the provision of public goods and services and investment in public infrastructure.  It 
seems that all of these effects would likely be mitigated by increased Federal assistance 
to subnational governments.   
 
The evidence from the research just mentioned, as well as previous research on state and 
local government finance, provides partial (but not complete) support for the notion that 
  12increased Federal assistance to states and localities could have a salutary macroeconomic, 
financial, and fiscal impact.  Fiscal transfers to subnational governments typically do 
result in higher levels of public expenditures by recipient governments, although, to some 
degree, these transfers are also offset by reductions in recipient government taxes.  From 
an aggregate fiscal stimulus perspective, it seems likely that sufficiently large transfers 
could indeed increase aggregate demand, both by raising state and local expenditures and, 
through the less direct channel of local tax relief, by increasing consumption and 
investment expenditures by households and businesses.
6  
 
In terms of short-run liquidity and debt management, Federal government transfers can 
provide immediate relief to subnational governments that are unable to pay their debt 
obligations or that face significant restrictions in raising funds through capital markets.  
Research by Poterba (1994), Bohn and Inman (1996), Alesina and Perotti (1999) and 
other authors indicates that limitations on the ability of subnational (particularly state) 
governments to borrow (for instance, as a result of balanced-budget rules) may indeed 
restrict their spending, a finding that also emerges in some current research on municipal 
government infrastructure spending (Buetter and Wildasin, in progress).  Federal fiscal 
assistance may protect the ability of subnational governments to maintain public services 
and to sustain investments in infrastructure, even in the face of declining revenues and 
unusual financial market constraints.  In the absence of such relief, the results 
summarized in Section III, as well as research reported elsewhere, suggest that 
municipalities may increase taxes and cut spending now and in future years as they adjust 
their fiscal policies to adhere to their long-run budget constraints.   
  13 
Despite these potential benefits from increased Federal transfers to subnational 
governments, the overall desirability of major increases in fiscal transfers to subnational 
governments remains unclear.  First, from an aggregate demand management viewpoint, 
it is debatable whether Congress can enact appropriate fiscal stimulus legislation 
sufficiently rapidly to achieve desired macroeconomic goals if it is simultaneously to 
promote other public policy desiderata.  After Congress acts, it takes time for recipient 
governments to respond to Federal assistance.  It is quite possible that any such assistance 
may arrive too late to help with recovery from the current recession; in fact, it may 
augment demand expansion during the anticipated future economic recovery to an 
undesirable degree, thus solving few macroeconomic problems and perhaps adding some 
new ones.  
 
The time lags involved in this process can be minimized by swift Congressional action on 
financial relief programs that have a minimum of regulatory oversight and control, 
perhaps by directing assistance to projects that are already on the drawing boards and that 
are ready to implement -- so-called “shovel-ready” projects.  However, in this case, it is 
quite possible that other possible policy objectives may be compromised.  The stock of 
“shovel-ready” projects may or may not be distributed among states and localities in a 
way that matches fundamental public assistance priorities.  For instance, some relatively 
disadvantaged regions, coping with limited revenues, may have only limited plans in 
place for immediate increases in expenditures on infrastructure or other projects, even 
though their capital stocks may have deteriorated substantially due to ongoing economic 
  14weaknesses; in this case, Federal assistance delivered with a mandate for rapid action 
may end up in regions where needs are less pressing.  Furthermore, projects that are 
ready for immediate action may, in fact, be projects that would have been undertaken in 
any case, which is to say that Federal assistance for these projects would have little 
impact on subnational government spending over a short time horizon (less than one year, 
say).   
 
This problem is not an unfamiliar one. Writing of an earlier period of fiscal crisis, 
Gramlich (1978) recounts, “In July 1976, Congress passed a strange piece of legislation 
called the Local Public Works Capital Development and Investment Act of 1976 … . 
This act, intended to stimulate the economy, gave free money … to state and local 
governments for projects that could be started within 90 days, almost ensuring that the 
projects were the sort that might have been constructed anyway.” Gramlich (p. 209) goes 
on to describe some of the problems regarding the timing of this assistance, which 
created considerable uncertainty for potential recipients, and concludes that the upshot 
may well have been that “in the name of stimulating the economy, the government passes 
a $2 billion program that appears to have caused a postponement of as much as $22 
billion in total government spending and a reduction in GNP of perhaps $20 billion!”  
These figures are trifling by today’s standards, but the lesson is a valuable one 
nonetheless.  Subnational governments, as of late 2008, may be wisely (from their 
viewpoints) postponing important public projects in order to have them ready to go when 
(and if) a major relief bill passes Congress in 2009 – just the sort of perverse response 
that policy uncertainty that seems to have undermined the 1976 initiative. The timely 
  15manipulation of fiscal policy to achieve desired macroeconomic impacts is a subtle and 
difficult undertaking, and it is far from clear whether it can be successful in the present 
context.  
 
However important it may be for the Federal government to stimulate aggregate demand 
through fiscal policy initiatives, the assessment of proposed Federal relief to state and 
local governments cannot focus exclusively on macroeconomic factors.  Large amounts 
of government expenditure ought to do something useful. It is natural to wonder whether 
incremental expenditures undertaken by subnational governments in response to Federal 
financial relief would be directed to high-value uses or whether, instead, a new program 
of Federal assistance to subnational governments would result in wasteful public 
expenditures.  In recent months, the prospect of using Federal assistance to expand 
spending on “infrastructure” projects – roads, bridges, transit systems, and the like – has 
been much discussed.  For many years, commentators have expressed concern about the 
condition of the nation’s infrastructure, and some seem to feel that a program of Federal 
assistance in support of public capital investment is needed.  Indeed, it is possible that 
states and localities have a large backlog of infrastructure projects that are now, and 
perhaps for some time have been, right at the cusp of adoption: almost, but not quite, 
important enough to cross the approval threshold in the budgeting process. If so, Federal 
assistance may “tip the balance” in a way that facilitates a sudden expansion of very 
useful upgrades to the stock of public capital.   
 
  16On the other hand, states and localities may have limited their expenditures on these 
types of projects in the past because they view other types of spending as more valuable.   
In this case, perhaps Federal assistance would better be directed toward those uses, 
whatever they may be – primary and secondary education, higher education, health, 
public safety, debt service, or the funding of public employee pension systems, to 
mention only a few.  In principle, nothing would prevent the Federal government from 
directing its resources to these objectives instead of, or in addition to, programs of 
infrastructure investment.  It is not easy, however, for Federal authorities to choose 
among such policy options, as it is not easy for them to ascertain how state and local 
governments, collectively and individually, ought to use their scarce budgetary resources.    
 
As an alternative mechanism of assistance to states and localities, the Federal government 
could provide relief for states and localities in a way that leaves them with a high degree 
of autonomy in the use of these funds. A program that provides cash transfers to each 
state on an equal per capita basis, for instance, could be enacted and implemented very 
quickly.  This would allow states to determine whether to spend incremental funds on 
infrastructure, education, debt service, transfers to local governments, tax relief, or any 
other alternative use of funds.
7   Insofar as the goal of Federal assistance is to help 
subnational governments overcome liquidity constraints, such a program would at least 
serve the purpose of putting cash in the hands of state governments.  A substantially more 
complex alternative, but one that would more likely stimulate recipient government 
expenditures, would be an open-ended matching grant program.  The fewer the 
  17restrictions on the uses of grant funds, the more quickly these funds could be disbursed 
and utilized.  
 
 Federal authorities may be reluctant to turn over large amounts of funds in such an 
unrestricted manner, however. The tension between the desire of donors to control the 
uses of funds and the desire of recipients to use funds in whatever way may seem most 
important is a familiar one, and there are valid concerns on both sides.  In ordinary 
circumstances, this tension can be managed through careful analysis of programmatic 
alternatives.  In the midst of a fiscal crisis where rapid policy responses seem urgent, 
such analysis may well fall by the wayside, with unpredictable consequences.
8  
From the viewpoint of state and local government debt policy, a program of Federal 
assistance could backstop subnational government debt obligations and perhaps prevent a 
series of defaults that would further undermine the operation of the capital markets.  If a 
major state or locality faces a serious risk of default, as may occur before the current 
crisis subsides, it is likely that pressure will build for emergency Federal relief.  
However, the effective implementation of any such relief is a challenging undertaking.  
Not all states and localities are equally at risk of financial failure.  Some have recently 
made difficult decisions to cut spending or to bolster revenues in order to mitigate such 
risk.  In past years and decades, some have pursued relatively conservative financial and 
fiscal policies, while others have been less cautious.  To offer only one illustration, the 
financial problems facing the state of California have attracted significant attention in the 
popular media.  California is a wealthy state, but it presently faces revenue shortfalls, 
partly as a consequence of its reliance on comparatively volatile revenue sources such as 
  18the personal income tax.
9   Emergency Federal assistance to states or localities facing 
particularly difficult financial circumstances in the current crisis would undoubtedly 
provide welcome relief to bondholders, taxpayers, public sector employees, and others in 
these jurisdictions.  It would also, however, likely flow to jurisdictions that have, in the 
past, followed relatively risky fiscal strategies.  
These considerations raise a fundamental policy concern.  Does Federal assistance at a 
time of financial crisis implicitly create perverse incentives that may undermine the 
overall system of subnational government finance?  As noted in Section III, German 
municipalities have developed a system of finance that depends, more so than is true for 
the US, on revenue sources that may be relatively volatile.
10   Plausibly, the incentives for 
subnational governments to adopt such policies are significantly influenced by the extent 
to which transfers from higher level governments help to insure them against the risks of 
revenue fluctuations.  The anticipation of such transfers, whether they result from the 
operation of a formal system of equalizing transfers or from ad hoc interventions, can 
shift the fiscal system as a whole toward increased subnational government dependence 
on Federal assistance in times of crisis.  Such a shift that would almost inevitably entail 
increased Federal regulation of subnational government financial management and 
concomitant limitations on subnational government policy autonomy. (Of course, as a 
constitutional matter, the Federal government’s power to regulate state governments and 
their subsidiary local governments is quite limited.  But, when backed by the prospect of 
generous funding, Federal government policy preferences are not easily ignored by states 
and localities.)  An upward shift of decisionmaking authority – from localities to states, 
or from states to the Federal government – may in fact be needed to limit the risks 
  19undertaken by subnational governments. Such a centralization of power could, in 
principle, help to enforce state and local government adherence to financially sustainable 
fiscal policies.  On the other hand, in view of the accumulation of large explicit and 
implicit liabilities at the Federal level in recent decades, it could be argued that lower 
level governments, subject as they are to self-imposed and market-imposed constraints, 
have in practice demonstrated a comparatively greater commitment to fiscal sustainability 





1. Many examples could be cited to illustrate the difficulties facing bond market 
participants.  This quotation, from a December, 2007 news report (Barr, 2007), captures 
some of the flavor: “By issuing warnings on FGIC and XL Capital Assurance, [Moody’s] 
is also putting more than 90,000 securities that the companies had guaranteed on review 
for a possible downgrade, according to global fixed-income analysts at UBS. The 
majority of those securities -- 89,709 -- are in the public finance sector, the analysts said, 
noting that this was "unprecedented" in the municipal bond market.”   
 
2. Subnational governments certainly do go through periods of financial distress. 
Nonetheless, defaults on subnational government debt, municipal bankruptcies, and other 
extreme breakdowns of the financial underpinnings of subnational governments are rare.  
As described in more detail in Wildasin (2004), there have been well less than a thousand 
municipal bankruptcies under Chapter 9 of the US bankruptcy law since its enactments in 
1937. Moreover, many of these bankruptcies have been comparatively small units of 
local government, such as special-purpose districts (e.g., small water districts).  Given 
that there are almost 100,000 subnational governments in the US, these bankruptcies are 
clearly exceptions to the rule.  Indeed, it is possible that the number and scale of local 
government bankruptcies is inefficiently small.  Further investigation of the optimal level 
of municipal bankruptcies may well be warranted.  
 
3. The fiscal and financial history of subnational governments in the US is a large 
subject, and one that is the subject of ongoing research.  Ratchford (1941) recounts the 
history of US subnational government debt from the Revolutionary War through the 
1930s.  Inman (2003) discusses how subnational governments have dealt with fiscal and 
financial crises through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, noting that higher level 
governments historically exercised substantial constraint in coming to the relief of 
distressed lower-level governments.  Zolt (2009) provides a recent analysis of the 
evolution of state and local government finances from the early years of the Republic to 
  20the present, emphasizing the interaction between economic inequality, particularly within 
different regions of the country, and the levels of public expenditures and taxation.  These 
works contain many additional references to related literature.  
 
4. The following discussion is based largely on studies of US municipalities by Buettner 
and Wildasin (2006) and analogous research on German municipalities by Buettner 
(2007).  As some of the following remarks suggest, this research builds upon a substantial 
body of earlier work, mainly focused on national governments, by a number of other 
researchers.  Interested readers are referred to these papers for additional references and 
discussion of the literature.  
 
5. For the sake of streamlined exposition, the following remarks make little or no explicit 
reference to many important complexities involved in the management of long-run fiscal 
policies, such as the problems of pension underfunding, infrastructure investment, the 
structure of taxation, or the management of natural resource stocks.  See, e.g., Boadway 
and Wildasin (1993) for a more thorough discussion of these matters and references to a 
large body of related literature.  
 
6. Romer and Bernstein (2009, n. 3) assume that Federal assistance to states will result in 
higher spending equal to 60% of the amount transferred, and that taxes will be reduced by  
30% of this amount, with the remainder adding to financial reserves.  
 
7. Equal per capita transfers to localities might seem to be a rather similar and perhaps 
attractive option, but it would be much harder to implement, particularly in a short period 
of time.  The 80,000 local governments in the US are organized in quite different ways in 
different states, and they perform many different functions. Any one household may 
simultaneously be a resident in a county, a city, a township, a school district, and zero, 
one, or several special-purpose districts.  In such a setting, it is far from obvious how 
Federal resources would best be distributed to localities.   
 
8. By way of illustration, some of these policy challenges may be encapsulated in the 
following quotation from a recent news article in a Las Vegas newspaper (Eckhouse, 
2009):   “Local jurisdictions have compiled lengthy wish lists of potentially ‘shovel-
ready’ projects, or those that could be under construction within 180 days. Among them: 
a $200 million project to build a more efficient ramp from the airport connector onto 
eastbound Interstate 215, $63 million in regional road repair and, of course, Las Vegas 
Mayor Oscar Goodman’s proposed $60 million mob museum downtown — a request that 
is being roundly rejected on Capitol Hill.”  Should Congress simply turn over funds to 
localities for new highway ramps, road repairs, and mob museums, or should it apply its 
usual, more rigorous standards of scrutiny to the use of Federal funds?  It is worth noting 
that the above-named projects evidently have not previously risen to the top of the local 
budget priority list, whether for good or for ill.  Whether they would, and should, cross 
the project approval threshold with Federal assistance of one type or another is a 
debatable issue.  
 
  219. The passage of California’s Proposition 13 in 1978 may have shifted that state’s 
combined state/local revenue system away from the local property tax and toward state-
level income and sales taxes, affecting the overall riskiness of combined state/local 
revenues. Some have argued that the California Supreme Court decisions in Serrano v. 
Priest (1971 and 1976), which mandated equalization of local school spending in that 
state, contributed to the passage of Proposition 13. Thus, equalization of local spending – 
court-mandated in the California case, rather than the result of an explicit equalization 
program, as in Germany – may indirectly have contributed to increased volatility of 
state/local government revenues. 
 
 
10. The advantages and disadvantages of such a revenue structure can be debated – valid 
arguments can be advanced in favor of the taxation of volatile sources of income, 
relatively to more stable sources of revenue.  (See Domar and Musgrave [1944] for a 
classic treatment that has stimulated a long line of subsequent research on the role of 
taxation as a form of implicit government insurance of private-sector risk taking.)  Some 
elements of the overall US fiscal structure, most notably the Federal personal income tax, 
but also income, payroll and sales taxes at all levels of governments as well as 
complementary expenditure-side policies, are already relatively sensitive to fluctuations 
in overall economic activity.  Especially in view of existing Federal policies, the 
incremental advantages of a shift toward more volatile subnational government revenue 
sources, if any, seem likely to be quite modest.   
 
 
11. Such, indeed, has been the experience in the US and other countries when higher 
level governments have had to step in to avoid financial collapse by lower-level 
governments.  US experience in this regard has been relatively limited, and state and 
local governments have continued to enjoy high degrees of fiscal autonomy even despite 
the occasional financial crisis.  The experience in other countries has been somewhat 
different.  See  Wildasin (1997) for discussion of the problem of “bailouts” and “soft 
budget constraints” in general, and with particular reference to the experience in the US 
and in countries such as Brazil and Argentina.  This general subject has been the topic of 
significant research attention in recent years: see Wildasin (2004), Oates (2005, 2006), 
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